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IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES AND THE LAW: PRI-
VATE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROB-
LEM. By Guido Calabresi.t Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse 
University Press. 1985. Pp. 208. Cloth, $20.00; paper, 
$11.95. 
Daniel A. Farber2 
"I am a torts teacher," begins this book on the abortion issue. 
The author, of course, is not just any torts teacher, but one of the 
premier legal scholars. His effort to bring concepts from tort law to 
bear on one of the most intractable issues of our time is not a com-
plete success. It was interesting enough, however, to make me want 
to teach torts. 
Most constitutional scholars teach only public law courses. 
They tend to know relatively little about private law, and this over-
specialization undoubtedly colors their views. For instance, much 
of the current philosophical writing on interpreting texts, as applied 
to the Constitution,3 would benefit from an understanding of how 
ordinary contracts and wills are construed by the courts. Whatever 
one may think of Dean Calabresi's theory about abortion, his use of 
a private-law perspective to analyze a constitutional problem de-
serves emulation. 
One further introductory point. Calabresi's book is a good 
deal more readable than most current constitutional scholarship. In 
part, this is simply a tribute to his writing style, but intellectual 
style is also involved. Again, he deserves emulation. As he 
explains: 
I feel more comfortable approaching a topic like this in common law fashion, 
trying to build up from cases, hypothetical and real, than by working down from 
great principles. I would rather approach the issues from a specific field of law-
itself affected by other fields of law as well as by its own peculiar problems and 
questions-and see where that leads us, than to try to deal with the topic as if I--<>r 
anyone-knew all law and was ready to describe it in terms of an abstract theory4 
The currently fashionable intellectual style favors grand theory over 
I. Dean, Yale Law School. 
2. Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. 
3. The January 1985 issue of the Southern California Law Review is devoted to a sym-
posium on this subject. 
4. G. CALABRESI, supra, at XV. 
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Calabresi's common law method, often leaving the reader with the 
uncomfortable feeling of being wafted into the stratosphere by a He-
gelian updraft. Though perhaps this is a confession of pedestrian-
ism, the worst of all scholarly sins, I prefer the common law 
approach Calabresi uses.s 
By now, the reader is probably getting a little impatient to find 
out how Calabresi connects tort law with abortion. Actually, I felt 
the same way while reading the book, since Calabresi keeps his 
rabbit well hidden in the hat almost until the end. Although I will 
not prolong the suspense quite as long as he does, I think it is better 
to begin with an earlier part of the book, in which he discusses the 
place of religious belief in tort law. 
I 
Religion and tort law may seem at least as far apart as abortion 
and tort law. As Calabresi points out, a recurrent problem in tort 
law joins the two. The problem relates to mitigation of damages, 
and can best be seen by considering one of Calabresi's hypotheti-
cals. In the hypothetical (a simplified version of a real case), a wo-
man is negligently injured and refuses medical treatment because 
she is a Christian Scientist. As a result, her injuries are aggravated. 
Is the woman entitled to recover for these aggravated injuries? The 
normal rule is that one can only recover for damages that a reason-
able person could not have avoided. So the question might be re-
phrased, "In the eyes of the law, can a reasonable person be a 
Christian Scientist?" The doctrinal answer is "yes," and Calabresi 
argues that this tort doctrine has been influenced by establishment 
clause concems.6 
This is indeed an interesting question from a constitutional per-
spective. Calabresi's analysis, however, is less than satisfactory. 
First, he relies heavily on another case that seems to be clearly dis-
tinguishable. In this second case a couple is negligently given tran-
quilizers instead of birth control pills by a pharmacist, and 
following what Calabresi describes as a tranquil but erotic interlude, 
the woman becomes pregnant. Can she recover for the cost of rais-
ing the child, or must she mitigate damages by getting an abortion 
or giving the child up for adoption? Almost everyone seems to 
agree that she need not mitigate her damages in these ways, and 
Calabresi views this as mandating the same result for the Christian 
Scientist. 7 Perhaps because I teach contracts rather than torts, the 
5. See Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917 (1986). 
6. G. CALABRESI, supra, at 46-60. 
7. /d. at 52-55. 
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two cases seem entirely different to me. In the case of the negligent 
pharmacist, the very reason for using contraceptives was to avoid 
the need for the other options. Therefore, to require mitigation 
would deprive the couple of the benefit of their bargain with the 
pharmacist. The case of the Christian Scientist raises purely tort 
issues, unlike the contractual issue of the pharmacist case. 
Second, Calabresi's treatment of the constitutional setting is 
oddly one-sided. He speaks entirely in terms of the establishment 
clause, which would be relevant only to the problem of whether 
courts can favor certain religious beliefs. But the logically prior is-
sue is whether courts can simply disallow all religious excuses for 
failure to mitigate. This is not an establishment clause issue, it is a 
free exercise issue. Can the state penalize a religious practice by 
taking away tort damages that would otherwise accrue? It's an in-
teresting question, but the relevant text is the free exercise clause. 
Oddly enough, as far as I can tell, Calabresi never mentions the free 
exercise clause. s 
Third, and most important, the constitutional interests are not 
all on one side of the balance. If the tortfeasor must pay higher 
damages because of the Christian Scientist's religious beliefs, then in 
a sense the tortfeasor is being required to subsidize a religious prac-
tice. Calabresi would, indeed, go much farther toward subsidizing 
religion. Religious beliefs might under some circumstances cause 
injuries to others that would otherwise be considered tortious.9 Cal-
abresi advocates setting up social insurance, funded by taxes, to 
compensate the victims. As he recognizes, such a scheme would 
"subsidize unusual religious beliefs by means of a small tax placed 
on other members of society."Io But such a subsidy for religious 
practices surely raises grave establishment clause problems. Indeed, 
it seems likely that the Supreme Court would hold it unconstitu-
tional, 11 though the Court's handling of religious issues is notori-
ously unpredictable. Surprisingly, Calabresi does not even discuss 
8. There is a passing reference to "the constitutional notions of separation of church 
and state and free exercise of religion" on page 55, but the discussion surrounding this phrase 
involves whether favoring secular beliefs over religious beliefs violates the establishment 
clause. Calabresi contends, not very persuasively, that secular beliefs are simply watered 
down versions of mainstream religious beliefs, and therefore that favoring secular beliefs is a 
discrimination against minority religions. /d. at 55-57. Since philosophy is several hundred 
years older than Christianity, and almost 2000 years older than Protestantism (the dominant 
American religion), one might just as well argue that religions are merely embroidered ver-
sions of secular philosophies. Neither position strikes me as sensible. 
9. /d. at 62-63. 
10. /d. at 170 n.260. The relevant textual discussion is at pp. 62-68. 
II. The case that seems most closely on point is Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 105 
S. Ct. 2914 (1985), in which the Court recently held that an employer cannot be required to 
make substantial sacrifices in order to subsidize an employee's religious preferences. 
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the possibility that subsidizing "unusual religious beliefs" might vi-
olate the establishment clause. 
Perhaps the explanation for this curious omission is that Cala-
bresi has other fish to fry. The point he is trying to make with these 
mitigation cases is that courts try hard to avoid stigmatizing reli-
gious beliefs by labeling them as unworthy. This is the link with 
abortion, for Calabresi says the Court did exactly that to the "pro-
lifers" in Roe v. Wade.l2 
This accusation seems a bit unfair. It is true that the Court 
refused to hold that fetuses are persons under the fourteenth 
amendment. But the Court did make some concessions to the pro-
life perspective. It refused to hold as a matter of constitutional law 
that the pro-lifers were wrong about when human life begins. It 
also held that in the third trimester the state's interest in preserving 
potential human life becomes compelling. Perhaps the Court could 
have held, as Calabresi would have preferred, that fetuses are per-
sons but that abortion is nonetheless permissible. Many pro-lifers 
simply would have regarded this as a confirmation that the Court 
lacked respect for human life. In a later case, the Court did explic-
itly state that the government has a legitimate interest in preventing 
abortion, though it may not use criminal sanctions to implement 
that interest.I3 The Court's decisions may all have been wrong, but 
the Justices cannot be fairly accused of exhibiting contempt for the 
values of the right-to-life movement. 
II 
Calabresi argues that the basic flaw in Roe v. Wade was the 
Court's failure to give weight to the values of both sides. His own 
approach to abortion can best be explained with a hypothetical. 
Suppose that women who engaged in traditionally male activities, 
such as working outside the home and driving cars, suffered from 
an increased rate of miscarriages, and that the number of these mis-
carriages equalled the present abortion rate. This would create a 
square conflict between women's right to equality and the interest in 
preserving fetal life. Although some might simply view the miscar-
riage rate as proof of women's "natural place," most people would 
12. G. CALABRESI, supra, at 95-97. 
13. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977): 
Roe did not declare an unqualified "constitutional right to an abortion," as the 
District Court seemed to think. Rather, the right protects the woman from unduly 
burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her preg-
nancy. It implies no limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment 
favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the allocation 
of public funds. 
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undoubtedly view it as simply the price paid for greater equality in 
our society. Everyone would undoubtedly agree that this was an 
unfortunate price, and the government would probably fund a huge 
research program to reduce the miscarriage rate. Even if we all 
agreed that human life was being lost, our society would surely be 
willing to endure predictable human deaths in its pursuit of other 
goals. More generally, our failure to ban automobiles, which Cala-
bresi calls the "gift of the evil deity,"I4 shows that saving human 
lives is not always our highest priority; otherwise, we would all ride 
horses and bicycles. 
From Calabresi's perspective, this hypothetical is essentially 
identical to reality. If women are to enjoy equal access to sexual 
activity, he says, they must be allowed to have abortions.ls Other-
wise, they are being singled out for good Samaritan duty, by being 
forced to donate their bodies to keep fetuses alive. 
Many people might find Calabresi's argument more convincing 
if only the facts of human biology were different. If it took a con-
scious effort for a woman to keep the placenta supplied with blood, 
a woman who refused to do so might be considered only to have 
declined good Samaritan duty. But the relevance of the "good Sa-
maritan" argument seems more dubious given the way abortion and 
pregnancy actually work. 
As Calabresi notes, the "good Samaritan" approach originated 
with Judith Thompson, a philosopher.I6 She asks the reader to con-
sider the following hypothetical. (The Socratic method seems to be 
as popular with philosophers as law professors, no surprise in view 
of its origins.) You are kidnapped and attached to some kind of 
new medical equipment, the other end of which is attached to a 
world-famous violinist. Unless you remain attached to the machine 
for nine months, the violinist will die. Do you have a moral duty to 
be a good Samaritan under these circumstances? She thinks not. 
The appeal of this popular argument is that it finesses the "per-
sonhood" issue. But it has some weaknesses. Intuitions about the 
proper response seem sensitive to small changes in the facts. Sup-
pose you weren't kidnapped, but were somehow accidentally at-
tached to the machine? Suppose you can't just get up and walk 
away but have to kill the violinist first? 
The "good Samaritan" issue, from its biblical origins through 
Thompson's hypothetical, concerns the proper moral attitude to-
14. G. CALABRESI, supra, at 1-19. 
IS. !d. at 97-102, 106. 
16. See id. at 114. The bulk of Calabresi's discussion of the "good Samaritan" issue is 
at pp. 102-05 and the accompanying notes. 
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ward helping strangers. If the violinist is a family member, for ex-
ample, you may have a stronger obligation not to unplug yourself.I7 
It is not at all clear that the fetus and the pregnant woman should 
be considered strangers. Besides, some people, including both Cala-
bresi and myself (not to mention the Minnesota legislature), 18 be-
lieve that people do indeed have duties to aid even strangers. And 
finally, the "right to unplug yourself from stray violinists" is a little 
hard to find in the Constitution. 
To avoid these difficulties, Calabresi does not rely on any abso-
lute right to refuse aid. Instead, he makes an equal protection argu-
ment. Society may create duties of good Samaritanism, but what it 
must not do is to impose such duties only on one politically disad-
vantaged class. Hence, although Calabresi considers fetuses to be 
persons,I9 he reluctantly concludes that in this case equality must 
triumph over the conflicting goal of preserving human life.2o The 
fatal flaw in this argument is that if fetuses are persons, they too 
must have equality interests. (A colleague of mine once said that if 
liberals ever decided to oppose abortion, they would call it "age dis-
crimination.") Indeed, Calabresi himself thinks it would be uncon-
stitutional to deprive fetuses of the right to inherit property;z' one 
would think the right to life would receive equally stringent protec-
tion. And if fetuses do have an interest in equality, that interest 
would seem to be even more powerful than that asserted by women 
who want abortions. As John Hart Ely said: 
Compared with men, women may constitute such a [discrete and insular] "minor-
ity"; compared with the unborn, they do not. I'm not sure I'd know a discrete and 
insular minority if I saw one, but confronted with a multiple choice question requir-
ing me to designate (a) women or (b) fetuses as one, I'd expect no credit for the 
former answer.22 
17. Although the common law did not recognize any general duty to render affirmative 
assistance to another, one of the exceptions involved victims with a "special relationship" to 
the individual. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEE-
TON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 373-74 (5th ed. 1984). 
18. Minn. Rev. Stat. 604.05 subd. I, provides: 
Any person at the scene of an emergency who knows that another person is exposed 
to or has suffered grave physical harm shall, to the extent that he can do so without 
danger or peril to himself or others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed per-
son. Reasonable assistance may include obtaining or attempting to obtain aid from 
law enforcement or medical personnel. Any person who violates this section is 
guilty of a petty misdemeanor. 
19. G. CALABRESI, supra, at 93. 
20. /d. at 104. 
21. /d. at 93. 
22. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 
934-35 (1973). Earlier in the same paragraph, Dean Ely observes: "Compared with men, 
very few women sit in our legislatures, a fact I believe should bear some relevance ... to the 
appropriate standard of review for legislation that favors men over women. But no fetuses sit 
in our legislatures." /d. at 933. 
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As with his failure to recognize the competing constitutional inter-
ests on both sides of the religious mitigation cases discussed earlier, 
here too Calabresi fails to acknowledge that the equality interest is 
found on both sides of the balance. 
Despite its initial appeal, the "good Samaritan" approach 
seems ultimately unsuccessful. If fetuses are persons, then abortion 
raises many of the same ethical problems as euthanasia, and the 
issue cannot be avoided simply by agreeing to call abortion a passive 
denial of placental support.23 Indeed, in many of the most heart-
rending cases, the purpose of the abortion is not simply to "sepa-
rate" the fetus from the mother, as Calabresi would have it.24 In-
stead, the purpose is to prevent the fetus from being born, because it 
is so seriously defective its parents believe it is better to end its life 
now. Some people find this morally reprehensible, but it is hard to 
see how anyone could avoid having sympathy for parents who must 
make such a decision. 
On the other hand, if fetuses are not persons, it does not follow 
that abortion is always morally permissible, because even non-
human things can have some moral value. Gratuitously destroying 
a kitten (or a work of art) is wrong, and fetuses presumably at least 
have some value on that scale. Perhaps fetuses are quasi-persons, 
and have a status intermediate between those of humans and ani-
mals. But there doesn't seem to be any way to avoid the ultimate 
question of the fetus's moral status. From a constitutional point of 
view, of course, there is the further question of whether judges or 
legislators should decide the question; this is something Calabresi 
never addresses.2s 
It would be astounding if anyone were able to resolve the abor-
tion issue satisfactorily. Indeed, the deepest message of Calabresi's 
book is that no satisfactory resolution is possible given present tech-
nology. Technological change may eliminate the problem of un-
wanted pregnancies, or as Calabresi points out, may make it 
possible to remove the fetus from the mother and bring it to term 
somewhere else.26 Absent such a technological revolution, Cala-
bresi believes that we face what he called in an earlier book a 
"tragic choice" between competing values.21 He may well be right. 
23. After all, euthanasia can often be accomplished by withdrawing some form of medi-
cal assistance. 
24. "[A]bortion, as Professor Judith Thompson has so brilliantly argued, goes to the 
right to separate, even if destruction follows." G. CALABRESI, supra, at 114. 
25. He does devote a lengthy footnote to whether the issue should be left to the states. 
/d. at 191-92 n.363. He does not, however, discuss whether Congress would be a more appro-
priate decisionmaker than the Supreme Court. 
26. /d. at 113. 
27. G. CALABRESI & P. BoBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978). 
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In conclusion, this book fails to resolve the abortion issue, but 
then the author never purports to present a definitive resolution. 
What he does attempt to do, quite successfully, is to shed new light 
on the problem. Along the way, he has much of interest to say 
about issues like discriminatory insurance rates, tort recoveries for 
emotional injuries, and whether the "reasonable man" can be Ital-
ian. Unlike most recent books about constitutional law, this book is 
not only insightful, but also enjoyable reading. 
